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Section I: Introduction  
Stock based compensation has experienced growth as a form of non-cash compensation to 
employees. Equity compensation is used to align management’s long-term objectives with those 
of the company. Stock-based compensation gives management incentives to grow the company 
responsibly over a somewhat longer term versus making short-term decisions to meet bonus 
requirements.  The longer-term incentive is due to the vesting period of stock options. However, 
many scholars and practitioners, including Warren Buffet, argue stock options provide shorter-
term incentives than shares. Current accounting treatment of stock compensation by investors 
and analysts alike, however, draws the ire of many business world. Analysts treat stock 
compensation as a non-cash add back to free cash flow and ignore the costs or dilutive effects.  
Thus, stock compensation is linked to overvaluation (Mohanram, White and Zhao 2020).  
This study examines whether equity research analysts who treat stock compensation as a pro 
forma add back to free cash flow produce statistically different price target prices than those 
who do not. If considering stock compensation explicitly in valuing a firm improves the accuracy 
of analysts’ valuation, then I expect analysts that adjust for stock compensation have more 
accurate price targets. Alternatively, adding stock compensation back to calculate free cash flow 
may inflate valuation because it ignore the true cost of the options. 
The sample includes reports from analysts covering a subsample of companies in the 
technology sector. I compare the forecast error of earnings per share and revenue forecasts for 
analysts who explicitly consider stock compensation relative to those who do not.I find that the 
accuracy of analysts’ price targets does not differ significantly based upon stock compensation 
treatment. This finding implies that the overvaluation effects of stock compensation might not be 




Section II: Background 
Stock compensation is a, non-cash, operating expense that is allocated to multiple summary 
accounts on the income statement, including cost of goods sold, research and development 
expense and selling and administrative expense, but typically has its own line-item on the 
indirect cash flow statement as a reconciliation from net income to cash flow from operations. 
Stock option expense is calculated by finding the fair value of the option on the grant date, 
regardless if these options are vested or not. So, even though the options are issued, they are 
not exercised immediately which is a good thing for the employers and employees. Employees 
receive equity compensation as an incentive to perform well while employers save cash. When 
in-the-money options are exercised, the firm is obligated to issue the stock for less than the 
market price.  If firms purchase shares on the open market, they will repurchase the shares at a 
higher price than what the employee paid. A benefit of stock compensation is that firms are able 
to compensate employees in the current period without burning cash. Stock compensation is a 
“non-cash” expense because in the grant year, the employee received an equity option rather 
than cash, which  is why the expense is added back on the indirect cash flow statement to get 
Cash Flow from Operations (CFO). However, this scenario creates a dilemma for valuation and 
analyst forecasts.  
When these stock options are exercised the majority of firms repurchase circulating shares to 
satisfy option holders.  The repurchase of common shares for cash is reflected in the Cash 
Flows from Financing Section of the cash flow statement. There is no additional expense on the 
income statement when the options are exercised. This classification in cash flow for 
repurchased shares is part of the flawed valuation concept. A standard equation to calculate 
free cash flow is: 
FCF = CFO – Capital Expenditures 
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The addback of stock compensation to get CFO is included in this calculation, but the cash 
outflow in the future when the options are exercised and satisfied with repurchased shares is 
never reflected in free cash flow. This equation functions under the assumption that stock-based 
compensation is permanently a cash free expense, which is not true for most firms.  
Prior research already shows the link between overvaluation and stock compensation. 
Mohanram, White and Zhao (2020) find that the exclusion of stock compensation as an expense 
and adding it back to free cash flow is associated with systematic overvaluation of firms. 
Further, they find that higher levels of stock compensation are associated with higher levels of 
stock repurchases. This finding supports the position that stock compensation is not a true non-
cash expense and that the current exclusion of it from DCF valuations is faulty. Higher levels of 
repurchases requires more cash outflows. This same study also finds that the size of stock 
compensation across all firms and industries has increased over the past 15 years (Mohanram, 
White and Zhao 2020).  
Free cash flow is a key figure that investors focus on when evaluating a company and a vital 
component of common valuation techniques. Bhojraj (2020) finds that for the 750 largest market 
capitalization firms, on average, stock compensation increases free cash flow by about 10%. 
This impact becomes as large as 25% for firms with the largest market capitalization. These 
large adjustments in the free cash flow equation play a large role in asset mispricing.  
This issue extends further than just free cash flow calculations. Zhang, Zheng (2011) finds that 
pro forma earnings miscalculations are negatively correlated with future abnormal returns. Stock 
based compensation is a common adjustment in metrics, such as Adjusted EBITDA, used in 
valuation. This finding implies that investors are mispricing assets when they remove the cost of 
stock options and it is negatively affecting their forecast accuracy.  
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Literature shows that the current use of stock compensation in valuation and forecasting is not 
accurate. The scope and impact of stock compensation adjustments is increasing but its effect 
on price target accuracy has not been researched extensively. I extend the literature by 
examining a sample of recent IPOs.  The benefit of this sample is that analysts have little prior 
history to guide the valuations.  I examine the analysts’ reports to identify the valuation 
methodology each analyst uses and how they address stock option expense.   
Section III: Sample Design and Rank Methodology 
My sample includes 50 different equity research reports covering 6 different companies that 
operate in the technology industry. Technology companies were selected because this industry 
is well-known for firms going public with negative net earnings and cash flow but with high levels 
of stock-based compensation. First, this is important because literature shows that stock 
compensation as percentage of operating expenses has increased from 2.6% in 2006 to 3.8% 
in 2018 (Mohanram, White and Zhao 2020). Second, the Equilar Institute finds that in 2015, 
technology companies had the largest number of options issued at 2.8 million, with the next 
closest industry at 1.1 million (2015). These two factors led to the emphasis on technology 
companies. These six different companies are drawn from a list of 2018 Technology Initial 
Public Offerings (IPO) with an emphasis on larger firms with a significant level of stock-based 
compensation. All 50 analyst reports were obtained from the Thomson One database and are 
all “Initiating Coverage” reports written soon after each respective firm’s IPO. I used initial 
coverage reports because they tend to contain more details and to reduce differences in analyst 
effort across report types. 
I obtain or calculate the following metrics from each “Initiating Coverage” report: price target, 
price forecast error, revenue forecast error, numerator/denominator adjustments related to 
stock-based compensation, valuation methodology and the associated rank given to each 
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report. Price target is the initial price target. The price forecast error is the difference between 
the analyst’s target and the firm’s actual stock price a year from the IPO date. The revenue 
forecast error is the difference between the analysts’ revenue forecast (in dollars) and the firm’s 
revenue for fiscal year 2019. Each report was analyzed to see what adjustments were used to 
account for stock-option effects. Examples of adjustments would be whether stock-based 
compensation was added back or subtracted in calculating Free Cash Flow or if a dilutive effect 
on shares outstanding was implemented. Any report that contained such an adjustment would 
be designated with a “Yes” and a “No” for reports that did not adjust all. The valuation 
methodology is based upon how each analyst describes arriving at their price target and 
whether it was a DCF, relative valuation multiple, or a mix of both. DCF and sales multiples are 
two of the most common valuation techniques employed analysts, with other common methods 
being price-to-earnings ratios, relative price-to-earnings ratios, EBITDA multiples, Economic 
Value Added, and price-to-book ratios. Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2005) examines whether use of 
any of the prior mentioned valuation methods is systematically more accurate than others. They 
found no association between valuation method and price target accuracy, implying that it does 
not matter which valuation method an analyst uses to arrive at a price target.  
To facilitate comparisons across firms, I rank relative absolute accuracy within firm. Rankings 
from most accurate (1=most accurate) are assigned for all the reports for a given company and 
rankings of reports for different companies are completely independent. Ranks are then 
standardized by subtracting one and dividing by the number of analysts minus one, so that 
standardized ranks range from 0 to 1. In cases where two analysts have the same price target, 
the error for revenue is the tiebreaker since there are no adjustments for revenue.  
I perform two sample t-tests on the rank, price forecast error, and revenue forecast error to 
determine if there are statistically significant differences between reports with adjustments for 
stock compensation and those with no adjustment. I expect that if adjusting for stock 
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compensation improves analysts’ forecasts, analysts with adjustments will have significantly 
smaller price errors.  
Section IV: Results 
Exhibit A: Valuation Methodology 
Valuation Methodology DCF 
Sales 
Multiple Both Unclear/Neither 
Number of Timed Used 11 19 12 8 
This table gives a breakdown of the different valuation methods used by the analysts in the 
sample. The “Both” column means the analyst’s price target put a weighting on both a DCF 
model as well as a Sales Multiple calculation. This total is excluded from the DCF and Sales 
Multiple totals so that they only show analysts who focused solely on those methods. The 
“Unclear/Neither” column is for reports that did not explicitly say what methods were used or if a 
different method was used (e.g., PEG ratio).  
Most analysts utilize a sales multiple for part or the entirety of the calculation of their price 
target. This finding is consistent with prior research. Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2005) find that 
most analysts report that they use a simple earnings multiple to derive their valuation. In the 
case of this sample where many of the firms are not profitable, it is logical to expect these 
analysts would shift to a revenue multiple. Sales multiples are applied to forecasted sales – 
ignoring expenses. This avoids problems with negative income forecasts but also ignores stock 
compensation. Using relative valuation models like sales multiples could mean that any 
overvaluation effects are not recognized. DCF models are more rigorous but are difficult to 
implement for firms reporting losses. Moreover, if analysts add back stock options expense in 
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projective revenue in their DCF models, then valuations might be overly optimistic. The 
prominent use of sales multiples in my sample reduces the effect stock option treatment might 
have on price targets since DCFs are not the main form of valuation method cited by the 
analysts.  







Price - Average 34.12% 25.61% 
Price - Median 29.90% 16.30% 
Revenue - Average -10.80% -12.13% 
Revenue – Median -12.10% -12.10% 
This table presents means and medians forecast error of analyst price target to actual price and 
analyst revenue projections to actual revenue. Analysts that made an adjustment for stock-
based compensation had higher average target price error than those that do not. However, 
these analysts have a lower revenue forecast error. Although the average difference in price 
target forecast errors is large, it is due to one firm having poor stock performance over the 1-
year post-IPO period and thus causing negative price forecast errors. There are 6 reports for 
this firm that did not adjust for SBC vs only 2 reports for analysts that did adjust. The larger 
number of negative reports where analysts did not adjust skews the figures in favor of analysts 
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who adjust. The rank test in the next section accounts for these errors by ranking based off 
absolute difference instead of raw forecast errors.  
Exhibit C: Rank test for SBC Treatment 
 
Adjusts for Stock 
Compensation 
Does No Adjust 
for Stock 
Compensation 
Rank - Average 0.51 0.49 
Rank - Median 0.50 0.50 
I conduct a rank test to see if analysts who adjusted for stock compensation and those that did 
not had differences in the average rank of their respective reports. Lower ranks indicate higher 
accuracy. Analysts who adjusted for stock-based compensation were ranked slightly better than 
those who did not. This test implies that analysts who did adjust for stock-based compensation 
had reports that were ranked higher than those who did not. Next, I test the statistical 















First, I test whether the variances are equal by performing a F-Test for Two-Sample for 
Variances. The F-Test for each of three metrics indicates that the variances are unequal. Next, I 
use a two-sample t-Test for unequal variances to test the differences in rank, price, and revenue 
forecast errors for statistical significance. In all three tests, I find no significant difference 
between analysts who adjust for stock options and analysts who do not.  This test implies that 
whether an analyst makes an adjustment for stock-based compensation or not does not have 
an impact on the accuracy of their projections. This conclusion implies that while the treatment 
of stock-based compensation for new firms is inaccurate, it does not have a large enough effect 
on cash flow to overvalue a company enough to change analyst’s price target. The DCF 
analysis could be giving a value too high but it does not differ enough from other forms of 
valuation to significantly shift a price target upwards.  
Another possible takeaway is that stock-based compensation does have an impact on analyst 
projections in the broader population, but this sample does not reflect the ongoing challenges in 
forecasting the effect of stock compensation. IPO firms require different treatment from analysts 
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since there is no prior public history of the company. This could mean stock compensation does 
not play as big a role as it might for established firms. The six companies in this sample are all 
companies with limited earnings and cash flow. Companies with poor cash flows are poor 
candidates for fundamental valuation, like a DCF. This reason could be why many analysts in 
this sample used a sales multiple as the sole or part of price target calculation. Forecasting 
revenue growth may be more critical in young firms. Since there is reduced weighting on free 
cash flow and fundamental analysis in this sample, the effect of stock-based compensation on 
valuation accuracy could differ from the impact for more mature firms.  
Section V: Conclusion 
This study finds that there is no evidence to suggest that analysts who add back stock-based 
compensation to free cash flow in DCF valuation produce significantly different price targets 
than those who do not. Previous research shows stock-based compensation add backs are 
associated with overvaluation and a negative correlation with abnormal returns. However, for 
IPO firms, the impact of stock compensation has little impact on price target accuracy.  It is 
possible that even though free cash flow is inflated, it does not have a large enough impact on 
analysts’ valuations. Also, most analysts in this sample relied upon relative valuation techniques 
due to the unprofitability of some of the firms in the sample. This different valuation method 
could reduce the likelihood of errors due to ignoring stock compensation expense in DCF 
models.  
One topic that is not clear after research is if whether analyst who uses a relative valuation 
technique in conjunction with a DCF was able to reduce the overvaluation influence of stock 
compensation add backs. Most analysts in this sample placed full or partial weighting on sales 
multiples. If these multiples produced a lower target price than a DCF, it could reduce 
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overvaluation. Future research should analyze how the use of multiple valuation methods 
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